Santa Clara University

Scholar Commons
Religious Studies

College of Arts & Sciences

2001

Introduction - Misogyny and Religion under
Analysis Masterplot and Counterthesis in Tension
Diane Jonte-Pace
Santa Clara University, djontepace@scu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/rel_stud
Part of the Religion Commons
Recommended Citation
Jonte-Pace, Diane E. "Misogyny and Religion under Analysis Masterplot and Counterthesis in Tension." Speaking the Unspeakable:
Religion, Misogyny, and the Uncanny Mother in Freud's Cultural Texts. Berkeley: U of California, 2001. 1-19.

All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission from University of California Press.
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts & Sciences at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Religious Studies by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.

INTRODUCTION

Misogyny and Religion
under Analysis
Masterplot and Counterthesis in Tension

Freud's Oedipal paradigm, characterized by death wishes for fathers
and by erotic desires for mothers, constitutes what has been called his
"masterplot" (Brooks 1989). It is the thesis for which he is best known
and which he saw as his "immortal contribution" to Western culture
(SE

s: 453). The Oedipal masterplot, articulated in Freud's earliest psy-

choanalytic writings and frequently reiterated during the forty years of
his psychoanalytic career, provided the foundational structure for his
analyses of psyche, culture, and religion.
Freud was deeply committed to pursuing and promoting the
Oedipal thesis. Although he did not formalize it as a "complex" until
1910 (SE I r: 171), he described his earliest discovery of the Oedipal par-

adigm as a "revelation" (SE r: 265), and he found Oedipal solutions to
most of the riddles he encountered. But below the surface of this
Oedipal masterplot, particularly in his writings on religion, lies another
thesis, which might be called a "counterthesis." This counterthesis
differs from the "pre-Oedipal" thesis evident in Freud's late texts and
developed further in the work of object-relations theorists like D. W.
Winnicott (1972). 1 It differs as well from the "anti-Oedipal" argument
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of Deleuze and Guattari (1983). Often interruptive and subversive, this
counterthesis haunts Freud's writings as if to challenge the dominance
of the Oedipal paradigm. It appears most frequently in images and
metaphors which, although intended as support for the Oedipal masterplot, actually decenter it.
The Oedipal theory gives centrality to the father: the "father complex" is a term Freud often used as an abbreviation of sorts for the
"Oedipus complex." In the Oedipus or father complex, death wishes,
hostility, and parricidal fantasies are directed toward the father.
Concomitantly, the mother is beloved: the mother-son relationship is
"altogether the most perfect, the most free from ambivalence of all
human relationships" (SE

22: 1 33),

and the mother is the object of

erotic, incestuous fantasies of sexual union. But there are exceptions to
this pattern. On rare occasions, and with hesitation, Freud discusses
death fantasies in relation

to

the mother, rather than the father, explor-

ing matriphobic and misogynist fears and fantasies: fears of the mother,
desires for her death, and fantasies of immortality. These Freudian
explorations of matriphobia and matricide do not represent misogyny
on Freud's part. Rather, they represent analyses and interpretations of
psychological and cultural misogyny. The hesitant non-Oedipal speculations in which Freud analyzes death and the fantasy of immortality in
association with the mother are part of what I call the counterthesis.
They occur most visibly in Freud's writings on religion.

MISOGYNY AND RELIGION UNDER ANALYSIS
In this work, I expose the shadowy presence of this non-Oedipal counterthesis in the cultural texts on religion. My sources are not only
Freud's four major "cultural texts," Totem and Taboo} The Future of an
Illusion} Civilization and its Discontents} and Moses and Monotheism} but

also some of his shorter writings related to religion and mythology
("Medusa's Head" and "The Theme of the Three Caskets," for example), and some of his writings which address religious themes and issues
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only indirectly (such as "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death"
and The Interpretation of Dreams). All of these are "cultural texts" in a
larger sense (Homans '1989: 196). They are not only about intrapsychic
or interpersonal dynamics, but also about the intersections of body, psyche, and society. They address the sou.rces and meanings of the fragile
"achievements of our civilization" (SE 14: 307) embodied in art, literature, philosophy, ethics, religion, science, and education. Within these
cultural texts, broadly defined, the counterthesis is apparent at several
sites: it is particularly evident in Freud's writings on the maternal body,
death and the afterlife, Judaism and anti-Semitism, and in his writings
on mourning and melancholia.
Religion is not only the subject of the texts in which the counterthesis emerges most vividly, religion is also part of the counterthesis itself.
Although it is never fully developed in Freud's writings, the counterthesis points toward a psychoanalytic theory of the loss of religion
and the absence of God: it represents a step toward an analysis of religion in absentia, of Jewishness in the context of secularism, assimilation,
and modernity. When one becomes attentive to the eruptions of this second thesis into the more immediately apparent Oedipal narrative,
Freud's theory of religion emerges as a more complex theory and as a
theory which points toward a feminist analysis of deeply rooted forms
of cultural misogyny and xenophobia.
The counterthesis intrudes into Freud's texts in three ways. Some
intrusions interrupt and subvert an Oedipal analysis. Others explicitly
acknowledge the limitations of the Oedipal paradigm. Still others
tentatively and hesitantly begin to develop non-Oedipal analyses.
Although these three kinds of intrusion are sometimes overlapping,
they can, at least heuristically, be differentiated.
In his first major work, The Interpretation of Dreams, discontinuities
in an Oedipal argument reveal elements which have no place in the
parricidal and incestuous paradigm. In the "dream book," Freud is
quite cognizant of the limitations of the Oedipal theory. He discusses
the point at which one must turn aside from dream interpretation, the
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"spot in every dream at which it is unplumbable, a navel as it were, that
is its point of contact with the unknown" (SE 4:

I I I,

n.

I).

Freud's essay

"A Religious Experience," written fairly late in his life, illustrates
another sort of intrusion: non-Oedipal themes interrupt and subvert an
Oedipal analysis almost against Freud's will. Still other texts, many of
which date from the middle period of his psychoanalytic career, like
"The Uncanny," "Mourning and Melancholia," and "On Transience,"
represent subversions of the Oedipal masterplot which enact explicit,
yet hesitant explorations of the counterthesis.
The counterthesis within Freud's texts, a trajectory incompletely
developed by Freud and virtually unnoticed by his previous interpreters, points suggestively toward new directions for the psychoanalytic psychology of religion, initiating a feminist "analysis" of Freud's
cultural texts on religion. By pursuing Freud's analysis of religion, we
encounter not only God, but also the absence of God; not only the afterlife, but also the rejection of the afterlife; not only Judaism, but also the
loss of Judaism. The absence of religion thus proves as significant as its
presence in Freud's work.
This introduction situates the project in relation to other feminist
responses to Freud in religious studies. In addition, it describes the
tenacity of the Oedipal masterplot in Freud's work and suggests how
his incompletely developed counterthesis enables a feminist analysis
and critique of misogyny and xenophobia in culture and the unconscious. The first chapter exposes the counterthesis in both an early text,

The Interpretation of Dreams, and the much later "A Religious Experience." At sites that bracket the entire span of Freud's career, the
limitations, interruptions, and subversions of the Oedipal masterplot,
the points at which Freud turned aside from Oedipal interpretation,
thus become evident.
The second chapter focuses specifically on the themes of death,
immortality, and the afterlife, revealing in Freud's texts, in addition to
an Oedipal theory of patricidal fantasies, a set of images involving dead
mothers, mothers as instructors in death, and "uncanny" (unheimlich)
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maternal bodies. Freud's analysis of "the uncanny" as a term which
"comes

to

mean its opposite" is pivotal for the counterthesis. Death,

immortality, and the mother's body are all described as "(un)canny":
Freud used similar terminology to describe the fantasy of a heavenly
afterlife, a "home in the uncanny," and the genitals of the mother, an
"uncanny home."
The third chapter turns to the notion of the "uncanny Jew" as a
widespread trope in Central Europe and as a subtext in Freud's essay
"The Uncanny." Freud initiated a fragmentary analysis of the unconscious intersections of Jewishness, assimilation, death, and the mother
in which the (un)canniness or (Un)Heimlichkeit ofJewishness to Jews is
a central theme. This becomes evident in Freud's writings on his own
Jewish identity, especially through an analysis of two presentations to a
Viennese Jewish men's group, the B'nai B'rith, to which Freud
belonged for many years.
The fourth chapter examines Freud's comments on the entanglement of anti-Semitism with misogyny. Freud's description of castration
anxiety and circumcision as central to both the fear of the Jew and the
fear of the mother leads to a set of speculations on the "abject" as the
source of both xenophobia and misogyny.
The fifth chapter turns to two texts written in 1915, reflections on
mourning and melancholia, showing that the themes of the uncanny
mother and Jewish identity lie just below the surface of these texts.
Freud here shows himself as a successful mourner of religion in transition, but an unsuccessful or "melancholic" mourner of the lost mother.
Freud's inability to mourn the mother is far from idiosyncratic, however, for we are all melancholy mourners of maternal loss. Freud's
incomplete forays into this terrain offer fragmentary and provocative
interpretations of the unconscious associations of mortality and maternity and a promising step toward bringing to consciousness the sources
of the twin plagues of misogyny and xenophobia.
The epilogue moves beyond Freud, raising questions about the
forms taken by the counterthesis in contemporary culture and asking
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how our expressions of the counterthesis can be transformed from rage
and hostility into awareness and reconciliation. Anti-abortion web sites
on the Internet today provide a vivid illustration of the counterthesis in
contemporary culture: dangerous and deadly mothers, in the rhetoric of
the web sites, are closely associated with immortality, and Holocaust
imagery appears in projected and distorted form. Yet acknowledgment
of the "unspeakable" of the counterthesis may offer the possibility of
reconciliation between the opposing voices in the abortion debates.
Concluding remarks consider the implications of Freud's counterthesis
for the study of religion in modernity.

FEMINISM, FREUD, AND THE STUDY OF RELIGION
Freud has been criticized frequently, and correctly, for the male bias or
androcentrism of his Oedipal theory of religion and culture. Without
doubt, his Oedipal paradigm situates woman in a secondary role. She is
the object of incestuous desire in the fantasy of the male child, she is a
morally inferior being without a strong superego, and she is excluded
from the work of culture. The Oedipal theory, many have argued, rests
upon an assumption of female inferiority. Freud's analyses, these theorists conclude, seem to support a broad-based misogynist ideology. His
remarks on the origins of religion and morality in The Ego and the ld are
often cited as illustrations of this Oedipal androcentrism: "Religion,
morality, and a social sense- the chief elements in the higher side of
man- were ... acquired phylogenetically out of the father-complex
... the male sex seems to have taken the lead in all these moral acquisitions" (SE 19: 37; see Rizzuto 1979: 42). Similarly, many have pointed
critically to Freud's remarks in Civilization and Its Discontents suggesting that women are the enemies of culture. Less capable than men of
renunciation and sublimation, Freud argued, women "come into opposition to civilization and display their retarding and restraining
influence." Instead, "the work of civilization has become increasingly
the business of men, it confronts them with ever more difficult tasks and
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compels them to carry out instinctual sublimations of which women are
little capable" (SE 21: 103). This exclusion of women from the "capacity for cultural production" has troubled feminists for generations
(Garner 1985: 29). From this critical feminist perspective, Freud is seen
as a misogynist thinker.
Nor have Freud's speculations about morality and gender escaped
critique. Many have noted the androcentrism in his assessment of
women's morality in "Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical
Distinction between the Sexes," where he states, "I cannot evade the
notion (though I hesitate to give it expression) that for women the level
of what is ethically normal is different from what it is in men. Their
super-ego is never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its
emotional origins as we require it to be in men" (SE 19: 257; see Van
Herik 1982).
In Freud's Oedipal writings on civilization, religion, and morality,
then, his androcentrism stands out in vivid relief. The psychologist of
religion David Wulff summarizes the foundations of the feminist critique: "Freud's psychology of religion is ... clearly centered in masculine reactivity. It is the male's ambivalent relationship with his father,
both in his own and in the race's childhood, that lies at the core of religion as Freud views it" (Wulff 1997: 285). This androcentrism is clearly
evident in Freud's Oedipal analyses of religion. His critics are correct to
challenge and critique his approach. Freud's texts, however, can be read
in other ways. My project is what I call "analytic," rather than "critical"
or "inclusive" (Jonte-Pace 1997b, 2001).
Feminist scholars have reacted to Freud's androcentric accounts of
culture and religion in one of these three major ways. Feminist "critical" reactions have challenged psychoanalysis for its androcentrism, dismissing Freud for constructing a virtually "womanless" theory, for
assuming masculine normativity, and for portraying women as physically, morally, and intellectually deficient (Friedan 1963, Millet 1970,
Greer 1971, Sprengnether 1990, Kofman 1985, 1991). Sarah Kofman,
for example, a French theorist interested in literature, gender, and psy-
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choanalysis, rejects many of Freud's interpretations ofliterary texts: "If
literature, after a reductive treatment, can seem to bend itself to a [psycho]analytic reading, is it not because Freud's conceptions about women
coincide with those of the literature that he exploits? An adequation
between the literary and the analytic which, far from being an index of
truth, is merely an index that both are in the grip of the same cultural
and ideological tradition" (1991: 82). According to Kofman and other
feminist critics of psychoanalysis, Freud simply perpetuates misogynist
cultural ideologies.
Feminist "inclusive" reactions to Freud, on the other hand, seek a
psychological theory of religion which incorporates and attends to
women's knowledge and experience. These theorists have often turned
away from Freud and toward the alternative methodologies developed
by object-relations theorists (Winnicott 1972, Klein 1975) and self psychologists (Kohut 1971). This vein of psychoanalytic feminism attends
to the maternal-infant bond in the earliest, "pre-Oedipal" months oflife
(Chodorow 1978, 1989, Benjamin 1988, Flax 1990, Sprengnether 1990). 2
Mary Ellen Ross and Cheryl Lynn Ross, for example, argue that many
aspects of religious ritual and liturgy "can be comprehended within the
psychoanalytic interpretation of ritual if such interpretation is extended
to include the pre-oedipal period oflife" (1983: 27). These authors show
that the characteristics of the Roman Catholic Mass "flow from what is
essentially an experience of God as Mother" (1983: 39). By investigating
the mother-child relationship in the pre-Oedipal period as the psychological source of religious ideas and experiences, feminists have succeeded in avoiding psychoanalytic androcentrism by developing more
"inclusive" psychologies of religion, ritual, morality, and belief (Gilligan
1984, Ross and Ross 1983, Jonte-Pace 1987, 1993, Jones 1996, Lutzky
1991, Raab 1997, Goldenberg 1990).

Feminist theorists in the psychology of religion who pursue the "analytic" project, the project which most directly informs this study,
have initiated a rather different enterprise. Developing a partnership
between psychoanalysis and feminism, these theorists have inquired
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into the role played by gender in shaping experience and epistemology.
They have investigated the cultural construction of gender, and, as
theologian Rebecca Chopp puts it, they have examined the ways in
which "different categories and structures are marked and constituted
through a patriarchal ordering of gender division" (1993: 38). Mari Jo
Buhle's volume Feminism and its Discontents: A Century of Struggle with
Psychoanalysis reflects this analytic perspective, showing that feminism

and psychoanalysis have been engaged in a "continuous conversation"
about the possibilities for "human liberation" in America throughout
the twentieth century (1998: 3).
An important voice in the analytic project is that of Juliet Mitchell.
In her groundbreaking Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974), Mitchell
cautioned feminist critics against dismissing psychoanalysis, arguing
that "psychoanalysis is not a recommendation for a patriarchal society,
but an analysis of one." She insisted that "a rejection of psychoanalysis
and of Freud's works is fatal for feminism" (1974: xiii). In her view,
Freud's goal was to show how a patriarchal culture creates hierarchically gendered beings and how a phallocentric and patricentric world
turns infants into gendered women and men. Mitchell suggested that
Freud's notion of penis envy, often rejected by feminist critics of psychoanalysis, could be reconceptualized in social and cultural terms. If
the phallus is a symbol of the systems of social power and authority
from which women in patriarchies are excluded, then penis envy is a
way of describing a feminist concern for equality in the social, political,
and economic arenas.
Mitchell's concern was to defend Freud's theory of the construction
of gender in patriarchal culture. Her focus was not religion. Her work
nevertheless points toward new possibilities for the psychology of religion. Influenced by Mitchell's approach, feminist theorists in religious
studies have begun to consider how psychoanalysis might provide the
methodology appropriate for an analysis of gender, of androcentrism,
or of misogyny in religion and culture (Goldenberg 1997).
Julia Kristeva, another analytic theorist well known for her work in
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feminism and post-structuralism, has introduced into psychoanalytic
thinking a concern with the effects of language and power on subjectivity and culture. Many of Kristeva's writings from the r98os enact
feminist revisions of Freud's religious and cultural texts. In Powers of
Horror (r982), for example, she undertakes a rewriting of Freud's study

of the origins of ritual and a rethinking of his interpretation of the
sources of anti-Semitism (Jonte-Pace 1997a, 1999b). She goes beyond
Freud by pursuing an analysis of the horror of the "maternal abject" at
the foundations of the experience of the sacred.
Particularly significant in the "analytic" project is the work of the
psychologist of religion Judith Van Herik. In Freud on Femininity and
Faith (r982), Van Herik examined the role of asymmetrical gender cat-

egories in psychoanalysis, demonstrating that in Freud's Oedipal theory
of religion, belief is equivalent to femininity, wish fulfillment, and
Christianity. Morality, on the other hand, is equivalent to masculinity,
the renunciation of wishes, and Judaism. Her work represents a "gender analysis" of belief and morality in Freud's work.
A group of scholars in Jewish cultural studies, among whom are Jay
Geller, Sander Gilman, and Daniel Boyarin, has recently produced
another set of important feminist analyses of Freud, gender, and religion. The work of these scholars has been instrumental in demonstrating that Freud's writings represent a response to an anti-Semitic ideology widespread throughout fin de siecle Europe within which male
Jews were coded as feminine, effeminate, or homosexual. Freud
attempted to portray a masculinized Judaism, they suggest, in reaction
against this feminization of male Jewishness.
This book is a contribution to the analytic scholarship in the feminist
study of religion and psychoanalysis in that it does not simply dismiss
Freud as a theorist whose attempt to rethink culture and the unconscious has no relevance for feminism, as the feminist critics of psychoanalysis have done. Nor does it dismiss Freud by looking elsewhere for
theoretical models more "friendly" to women, as the inclusivists have
done. Instead, it interrogates the Freudian corpus, discovering ways in
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which it challenges its own hegemony and the hegemony of its culture
and uncovering patterns of subversion whereby Freud's counterthesis
undermines his own dominant paradigm. This project thus builds upon
(and sometimes critiques) the work of Mitchell, Kristeva, Van Herik,
Geller, Gilman, and other analytic theorists.
Like Mitchell, I believe that feminists cannot afford to neglect Freud's
work. We can benefit from close attention not only to the Oedipal interpretation of the construction of gender in patriarchal culture defended
by Mitchell, but also to the associations Freud traced in an incompletely
developed non-Oedipal counterthesis. Just as Mitchell reframed the
notion of penis envy as a feminist and social category, I suggest a rethinking of the notion of castration anxiety, arguing that it often slips beyond
the boundaries of the Oedipal theory into the realm of a pre-Oedipal
pattern of misogyny and death anxiety. Like Kristeva, I pursue Freud's
deeper insights regarding gender and religion, especially when that pursuit takes us beyond Freud's Oedipal formulations and into the territory
of the "abjection" of the maternal which Kristeva finds at the heart of
subjectivity, religion, and the sacred. Like Van Herik, I am interested in
constructing a feminist analysis of Freud's understanding of gender,
religion, and culture. Just as Van Herik's examination of Freud's writings exposed the play of gender in conceptions of belief and morality, my
inquiry into Freud's writing exposes the play of gender in fears and fantasies about mortality and immortality, Jewishness and anti-Semitism,
secularism and the absence of God. And like Boyarin, Gilman, and
Geller, I believe that Freud's writings on culture are best understood by
attending to his cultural context. I explore ways in which, as an assimilated (or assimilating) Jew in an anti-Semitic culture, Freud attempted to
theorize the gendered dimensions of his own Jewishness and the antiSemitism of many of his contemporaries: in addition to a "masculinization" of Judaism, Freud's writings also contain an analysis of the associations of the Jew with the feminine or maternal and with death and the
uncanny, both for the Jew and for the anti-Semite.
Although Freud is famous for asking the question, "Was will das
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Weib?" (What does a woman want?) (Jones I955: 468), a better formulation of his question is: "What do men think that women want?" This
question sometimes takes a related form: "What do men think that
mothers want?" A careful analyst of male fantasies and fears about the
desires of women and mothers, Freud was not unsuccessful at answering these questions. Although he insistently stated that men harbor fantasies of death toward their fathers and sexual desires toward their
mothers, he also, almost unwillingly, inadvertently, or unconsciously,
explored ways in which men wish their mothers dead and fear that
their mothers harbor deadly desires. Freud's theories thus "tell a story
about men's fear of women and the social consequences of that fear"
(Todd I986: 528). 3
If Freud's speculations on misogyny can be understood as accurate
accounts of the fantasies of men, are women exempt from these fears
and ideas? I think not. Women within patriarchal societies share, to
some degree, unconscious matriphobic ideas, fantasies, and ideologies
lying below the surface of dominant patriarchal discourses. Freud's
question, as I have revised it, "What do men think that women want?"
can be expanded into the more comprehensive, if less elegant question:
"What do we men and women fear that women (and mothers) want?"
Freud's answer to this question is complex. In Freud's texts, male
(and female) fears involving misogyny and matriphobia lie in close
proximity to religious fantasies of immortality and the afterlife, antiSemitic and homophobic ideas about degenerate Jews, and fears of
encroaching secularism. These are disturbing notions and fantasies, but
they must be confronted and interrogated. Unconscious misogyny and
xenophobia and their disastrous social consequences will not be eliminated without a careful analysis of their sources and manifestations. As
Harold Bloom has said, "Freud's peculiar strength was to say what
could not be said, or at least to attempt to say it, thus refusing to be silent
in the face of the unsayable" (Bloom I995: I I 3). Freud indeed attempted
not only to say the unsayable, but to speak the unspeakable, to say not
merely what cannot be said, but what must not be said because it is too
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disquieting to confront. In what follows, we read Freud carefully
enough to hear not only what he said, but also what he attempted to say.
The unsayable and the unspeakable are dangerous and destructive
only as long as they remain unthought, unsaid, or unconscious. Neither
unconscious misogyny nor other forms of xenophobia, with all their
tragic manifestations, will be eliminated without a careful interrogation
of their sources and variations. Nor will conflicts over religion or its
absence be resolved by turning away from an awareness of the tenacity
of the fantasies and fears underlying religious belief and disbelief. As
disturbing as they are, we need not turn away from these images, fantasies, and fears. Speaking the unspeakable about the self in the context
of the "talking cure" can produce a liberating or therapeutic awareness
of thoughts and memories that would otherwise become pathogenic.
Similarly, speaking the unspeakable about culture, religion, and gender
can be liberating or healing in broader contexts.

THE UNCONSCIOUS IN BODY, PSYCHE,
AND CULTURE
Like Peter Homans (1970, 1989, 1995 [1979]), who reads psychoanalysis
as fundamentally a theory about "images, symbol, and myth, about
interpretations that presuppose levels of meaning, and about culture"

(1970: 14), I read Freud as an interpreter of culture whose insights make
sense of symbolic and cultural tensions. Although Freud is sometimes
seen as a mechanistic reductionist or as scientist manque (Jones 1996,
Sulloway 1979), he is best read as an analyst of culture, ideology, and the
unconscious. He was, of course, trained in the medical and biological
science of the late nineteenth century, and the effects of that scientific
training are evident throughout his work. But the most important and
provocative dimensions of his writings are his formulations of the
spaces where the body comes into contact with culture and psyche,
where the fears and desires of the unconscious, the demands of civilization, and the "pulsions" of the body intersect (Kristeva 1987).
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Freud subjected cultural discourse- religion, folklore, literatureto psychoanalytic interpretation, suggesting that, in the words of Robert
Paul, "the symbolism of the unconscious encountered in dreams and
neurotic symptoms [is] embedded in the language permeating public
cultural discourse" (1991: 267). In addition, he maintained an interest in
the way culture provides the system of meanings within which individual development occurs. Although he was deeply concerned with
understanding and challenging the effects of cultural constraints on
individual behavior, a concern that Foucault dismissed as the "repressive hypothesis" (1980 [!978]: 10-49),4 he was also attentive to the subtle intersections of cultural, ideological, and unconscious fantasies and
desires. 5
Freud referred often to his project as an investigation of the unconscious in the Seelenleben (SE 14: 168). Although Strachey translates the
term as "mental life" (SE 14: 168), a better translation for Seelenleben is
"psychic life" or "the life of the soul." Freud portrays a "psychic life" in
which psyche, body, and culture are closely intertwined. He describes
how ideas are shaped, created, and maintained in the unconscious prior
to or alongside their enactment in the social arena. Ideas about divine
justice, ideas about destiny, death, and the afterlife, ideas about
Jewishness, ideas about the presence and absence of God, in Freud's
writings, are complex cultural and ideological constructions that resonate with the unconscious fears and desires of individuals. Freud's theory of religion is a theory of how religious ideas are created, experienced, and gendered in the unconscious mind, the Seelenleben, and in
culture.
I read Freud, then, as an interpreter of personal and cultural fantasies, a reader of psychic realities, an excavator of the unconscious. The
fantasies of individuals and the ideologies of cultures, viewed through
a psychoanalytic lens, can be seen as obscure revelations of unconscious
psychological activities. Reading Freud as a theorist of culture and of
the unconscious, I approach his writings on religion as attempts to formulate the workings of the unconscious in religious and cultural ideas
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and to expose the psychic realities underlying religious concepts. While
Freud's work is not beyond critique, his theories of culture have only
begun to be tapped. His counterthesis has lain undeveloped beneath the
Oedipal masterplot, its rich implications, both for challenging his dominant arguments and for interpreting culture, unexamined.
Feminists must use caution against facile engagements with master
discourses, for indeed, as Tina Chanter asks, "How are we to weigh the
strategic gains to be had from positioning oneself in relation to a master
discourse, even if one looks on it askance? Are the losses we incur too
great, or is this a risk worth taking?" (Chanter 1995: 216). 6 Such a risk
is, in fact, worth taking in relation to Freud's "master discourse." In this
book, I set out to demonstrate powerful contradictions, gaps, and inconsistencies deeply embedded in Freud's theories. My goal in focusing on
them is not to join in the condemnation of Freud's theories so common
in the contemporary era, but rather to argue that these contradictions
are meaningful. As Freud himself said in another context, "these contradictions stand in need of an explanation" (SE 5: 514).

THE TENACITY OF THE OEDIPAL MASTERPLOT
The centrality of the Oedipus complex in psychoanalytic theory is indisputable. It provides not only a paradigm for the structure of the psyche,
but also a system for the evaluation of culture. Freud himself called the
Oedipus complex "the shibboleth that distinguishes the adherents of
psychoanalysis from its opponents" (SE 7: 226 n. 1). It has been called
Freud's "greatest discovery" (Rudnytsky 1987: x) and "most important
paradigm" (Pollock and Ross 1988: xix). It lies "at the heart of Freud's
dynamic developmental theory" (Simon and Blass 1991: 161). Freud
applied the theory to child development, personality structure, and psychopathology, as well as to the broader phenomena of religious, cultural, and social institutions. In spite of his sometimes dramatic
modifications of the Oedipal theory, Freud insisted throughout his life
on the accuracy of the Oedipal solution to the riddles he encountered.
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Why did Freud turn aside from attempts to speak the unspeakable
and fail to confront and develop the non-Oedipal counterthesis that
haunts his writings? The answer to this question is complex and
overdetermined, but it is possible to isolate some of the intellectual, psychological, and sociohistorical factors. Intellectually, Freud's deep commitment to "uncritical self-observation" came into frequent conflict
with his fiercely held sense of the validity of the Oedipal theory (SE 4:
103). Psychoanalysis, for Freud, was at the same time method, content,

and theory. As an interpretive method, it provides a key to portals otherwise closed to consciousness: it is, as Freud put it, "a procedure for the
investigation of mental processes which are almost inaccessible any
other way." Second, this method leads to particular contents: it is a
description of the contents of the unconscious, a frank and uncensored
reportage, a "collection of psychological information" (SE 18: 235).
Third, it is a theory of the structure or framework- usually Oedipalwithin which this collection of psychological information is located and
organized.
Freud used psychoanalytic introspection as method fairly carefully,
faithfully reporting the results of his excavations of the unconscious in
his thinking and writing. While most of the unconscious contents he
encountered fell into place as pieces of a coherent theory, some of the
pieces simply did not fit the Oedipal puzzle. His attempts to locate these
contents within the Oedipal framework were often unsuccessful. His
writings are rife with representations that he did not develop into theories, fragments that he was unable to incorporate into his master thesis. In the words of psychoanalyst Didier Anzieu, Freud's work contains images "half glimpsed in the form of thing presentations ... which
he failed to turn into word presentations" (1986: 371). 7
This tension in the character of psychoanalysis is the context for the
counterthesis. Evidence for the counterthesis exists in half-glimpsed
images and half-formulated ideas he recorded in numerous texts and
documents. Although Freud never fully developed the counterthesis, its
traces remain clearly evident in his work in a complex overlapping of
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one conceptual grid upon another, like the palimpsestic relations of perception and memory that Freud described in his famous essay "A Note
upon the Mystic Writing Pad" (SE 19: 227). Separating the layers of the
"palimpsest" exposes masterplot and counterthesis in tension. 8 The
unlayering of this counterthesis relies, in part, on reading Freud in the
original German. Many of the connections I make are not apparent in
the English translation in the Standard Edition, but stand forth vividly in
the original language.
The tenacity of the Oedipal masterplot in Freud's theory itself
deserves comment. Numerous theories have been proposed to explain
Freud's insistence upon Oedipal solutions to life's riddles. Some have
focused on Freud's own personal relationships with his mother and
father (Sprengnether, Rizzuto, Robert), others on the social and cultural contexts of European anti-Semitism (Gilman, Geller, Boyarin). 9 It
is clear that Freud's insistence upon the validity of the Oedipal theory
was heavily overdetermined.
One aspect of that overdetermination is that Freud's revelatory sense
of the significance of the Oedipal pattern cannot be separated from a
personal sense of identification with the Sophoclean Oedipus Rex.
Freud's biographer, the psychoanalyst Ernest Jones, recounts a story,
now almost legendary, of Freud's sense of identity with Oedipus. In
1906, on his fiftieth birthday, Freud's followers presented him with a

medallion engraved on one side with his own portrait and on the other
with a design of Oedipus answering the riddle of the Sphinx. Inscribed
on the medallion were these words, in Greek, from Sophocles' drama
Oedipus Rex: "Who knew the famous riddles and was a man most

mighty." According to Jones, when Freud read the inscription, he
"became pale and agitated ... as if he had encountered a revenant."
The reason for Freud's discomfort, Jones later learned, was that "as a
young student at the University of Vienna he used to stroll around the
great Court inspecting the busts of former famous professors of the
institution. He then had the phantasy ... of seeing his own bust ...
inscribed with the identical words he now saw on the medallion" (Jones

r8

I

Introduction

1955: I5; cf. Rudnytsky 1987: 4-5). Freud's fantasized identification
with Oedipus was uncannily realized in the gift from his followers.
Freud and Oedipus were both solvers of riddles. The Sphinx had
asked Oedipus a riddle requiring an understanding of human change
and development: What walks on four, then two, then three legs?
Oedipus had answered the Sphinx's riddle, but Freud pursued the riddle further, explaining the gaps in the solution to the riddle, uncovering
the hidden history of the creature who walks on four, two, and then
three legs. The riddle, in Freud's extension, asked how the transitions
occur. What enables the creature to move from infancy to adulthood?
What causes the creature to limp in old age? Freud's answer to the riddle Oedipus had only begun to answer was, of course, Oedipus himself:
the Oedipus complex, the love of the mother and the hatred of the
father, moves the creature from infancy to adulthood. The Oedipus
complex wounds and limits the creature. The Oedipus complex leads
inevitably to the sufferings and infirmities of old age. Oedipus had
begun to answer the Sphinx's riddle, but Freud felt that he himself had
completed the puzzle, solving the riddle once and for all. Freud, like
Oedipus, "knew the famous riddles and was a man most mighty."
Freud encountered many riddles during his career. He argued that
most riddles are Oedipal riddles: he suggested, for example, that the
first problem encountered by children, "the riddle of where babies come
from," is, in a distorted form, "the same riddle that was propounded by
the Theban Sphinx" (SE 7: 195). He enjoyed using the rhetoric of the
riddle (das Riitsel) in his writing. He struggled with "the riddle of the
nature of femininity" (SE 22: r r 3), and he expressed bewilderment in
the face of the riddle of mourning, proclaiming "to psychologists,
mourning is a great riddle" (SE 14: 306). In autobiographical remarks
incorporated into a postscript to "The Question of Lay Analysis," he
described his lifelong desire to "understand something of the riddles of
the world in which we live and perhaps even to contribute something to
their solution" (SE 20: 253). Similarly, he posed questions about the riddle of faith and belief: "as though the world had not riddles enough, we
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are set the new problem of understanding how these other people have
been able to acquire their belief in the Divine Being" (SE 23: 123).
Although he wished to believe that most riddles are variants of the
riddle posed to Oedipus by the Sphinx and that their solutions are
Oedipal, as well, even Freud knew that some riddles escape Oedipal
solutions. So deeply attached was Freud, both intellectually and psychologically- and politically, as Schorske (1973), McGrath (r986), and
others have shown- to the notion that the Oedipal complex must be
correct, however, that he was only occasionally able to perceive the rich
counterthesis within his own sights. His images and metaphors reveal
the tenacity with which he held to the Oedipal theory, the way it functioned as an "unshakable bulwark" against alternate views (Freud, in
Jung 1963: 149).
Yet this bulwark was not truly unshakable. Noting occasionally the
limitations of the Oedipal paradigm, Freud initiated a trajectory contradictory to his Oedipal analyses of the origins of religion, morality,
and monotheism in primal parricides. Characterized by fears and fantasies focused on a dead or deadly mother, the counterthesis constructs
a fragmentary theory of death, immortality, and the afterlife, a tentative
analysis of the canniness of Jewish identity to the Jew and the uncanniness of the Jew to the anti-Semite, and a hesitant analysis of the loss of
religion and the absence of God.

